

CASE-12 · INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION

# Entering foreign market «P» with a €70 million direct investment

Replicating abroad the model that wins at home, betting on the advantage of arriving first in a huge market.

THE JUDGMENT

direct → staged

CALIBRATED CONFIDENCE

37%

SECTOR

Expansion



## EXECUTIVE VERDICT

# The home-market edge **doesn't transfer**: the first mover often paves the way for the local rival.

### THE CALL

direct → staged

### CONFIDENCE

**37%**

### IN ONE LINE

A **€70M** leap turned into calibrated bets, with far less capital at risk until the market confirms.

## § THE PROTAGONIST & THE CONTEXT

The CEO with responsibility for international growth, coming off three years of dominance in the domestic market, presenting the expansion plan to the board as a natural and urgent next step.

A consumer or B2C services company with a successful domestic product, a well-tested distribution model and a consolidated brand reputation. Market P is a large economy with 80 million consumers in the target segment and still-low category penetration. The window is framed as «now or never».

## § BACKGROUND

The track record of direct international expansions shows that the failure rate within the first three years exceeds 60% in markets with high cultural distance and distribution channels dominated by local operators. The «first-mover advantage» mechanism — the idea that arriving first secures defensible positions — is documented only in markets with high switching costs for consumers; in low-loyalty consumer markets, the first entrant spends to educate the market while the second entrant (local, faster and cheaper) reaps the reward. Regulatory and distribution barriers in market P have been systematically underestimated in prior analyses: the customer acquisition cost estimated in desk research has proved three to four times higher in comparable expansion cases.

## § COUNTER-INTUITIVE SCENARIO

What works at home often **doesn't transfer**: local needs, channels and competitors are different. «First to arrive» usually means spending to educate the market... and getting **overtaken by a local competitor** who copies and moves faster. The risk isn't the size of the market, but how much it costs you to learn and how high the distribution and bureaucratic barriers are.

### IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS

- ◆ The success at home will repeat identically there.
- ◆ Sales channels and rules are similar to ours.
- ◆ The brand works in that culture too.

### FALSIFICATION TESTS

- ◆ Before the €70 million, a light test (export, a partner, a pilot): does the product really appeal there?
- ◆ Map of local competitors and of regulatory and distribution barriers.
- ◆ Do the per-customer numbers on the ground (acquisition cost, accepted price, cost to serve) hold up?

### QUESTIONS THAT RAISE THE BAR

- ◆ What do you really know about the local market that isn't just a projection of the home one?
- ◆ What's the plan if a local competitor copies you in 12 months?

### CALIBRATED CONFIDENCE & PROVENANCE

that direct entry holds without first verifying that the product appeals

Provenance: local market research · competitor analysis · pilot/partner · red-team base.

## Customer acquisition cost: desk estimate vs field reality

ILLUSTRATIVE DATA

Desk estimate (expansion plan)

€18

Actual cost (comparable cases)

€64

Average estimated cost to acquire a customer in market P per the internal pre-entry analysis versus actual cost observed in comparable direct-expansion cases (illustrative data).

## 3-year failure rate: direct expansions in high-distance markets

ILLUSTRATIVE DATA

62%

OF DIRECT EXPANSIONS FAIL  
TO REACH BREAK-EVEN WITHIN  
3 YEARS

Share of direct international expansions into markets with high cultural distance and locally dominant distribution channels that fail to reach breakeven within three years of entry (illustrative data).

## OUTCOME

**Staged** entry (pilot → partner → growth), with a mandatory check that the product works before committing heavy capital.

## VALUE

A **€70M** leap turned into calibrated bets, with far less capital at risk until the market confirms.

## METHODOLOGICAL NOTE – READ FIRST

Composite cases, in the method of the Harvard Business Review: reconstructions based on real, recurring situations in each sector, merged and anonymized to protect confidentiality. The decision dynamics are authentic; names, figures and details are altered and not traceable to any single client or case. The «provenance» notes describe the type of evidence the engine cites with traceability in production. The  $\Delta$ -CSI values illustrate the intensity of the pressure the contradiction put on the assumptions.